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ATHEISM AND THE EFFECTS OF MORTALITY SALIENCE AND LIMITED 
ANALYTIC PROCESSING ABILITY ON RELIGIOUS FAITH 
BRETT WAGGONER 
ABSTRACT 
The scenario of the atheist in the proverbial foxhole has been a topic of discussion 
in religious circles for centuries. Building on prior research utilizing terror management 
theory (TMT), a dual process model of cognition, and previous work suggesting that 
humans are intuitively wired for teleological and religious concepts, the researchers set 
out to examine atheist’s religiosity when confronted with the reality of one’s 
impermanence. To explore this idea, the present experiment recruited a sample of 
atheists, manipulated their awareness of mortality, manipulated their ability to employ 
analytic thinking, and measured various intuitive cognitions (e.g., teleological reasoning) 
alongside religious belief. Results suggest that atheists in the speeded conditions reported 
higher agreement with teleological items; but the same did not happen for religious items. 
Additionally, atheists primed with mortality salience (vs. control) reported lower 
agreement with religious items in the un-speeded condition, but not in the speeded 
condition; a similar interaction was not observed for the teleology items. Limitations and 
potential directions for future research are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 In his classic novel The Stranger, French novelist Albert Camus (1942) tells the 
story of Meursault, a man who views life as completely meaningless, with death being 
the only ultimate destination, and with no God to save him from his unavoidable doom. 
While Meursault is in prison awaiting a death sentence, he is visited by the prison 
chaplain, who tries to convince Meursault that there is a God and that he should repent. 
Yet, even as the guillotine awaits him, the atheistic Meursault contemplates the nature of 
existence and comes to the conclusion that God is of no importance and that faith would 
be a waste of what little time he has left. Despite the chaplain’s repeated attempts, 
Meursault remains steadfast in rejecting the faith that promises to save him from his 
impending doom.   
 Meursault’s situation, as the atheist in the proverbial foxhole, has been a topic 
explored by philosophers and writers for many years. But in the past few decades, 
experimental psychology has begun to bring a scientific perspective to these profound 
issues as well. One particularly relevant psychological perspective is that of terror 
management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986), which posits 
that humans deal with the awareness of death by immersing themselves in socially 
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established worldviews that imbue the world with significance and offer the possibility of 
permanence. One type of cultural worldview that offers a strong sense of immortality is 
religion, which offers literal immortality (e.g., the promise of an afterlife) to its followers. 
However, atheists nevertheless choose to reject the supernatural claims of religion, and 
thus do not reap the psychological benefits that religion has to offer for managing the 
awareness of death. One of the explanations as to why atheists reject religion and other 
teleological concepts may be that they engage in analytical thinking to over-ride these 
otherwise cognitively intuitive beliefs (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). However, no 
previous research has tested this idea; that atheists maintain their disbelief, even under 
death awareness, by cognitively over-riding the motivation to express religious faith. The 
present thesis seeks to test this possibility. 
TMT and Research 
Humans are fundamentally social creatures that form groups and participate in 
vast cultures that consist of shared beliefs, values, and customs that give structure, 
meaning, and significance to the world around them. Humans invest in culture by 
participating in social and religious rituals, attending and cheering at sports events, 
participating in national ceremonies, or coming together for a common social cause, such 
as education, healthcare, or even music appreciation. When looking at human cultures 
from an evolutionary perspective one might wonder why humans are the only species to 
form such complex systems, and furthermore what function culture serves for our 
species. As humans developed a more advanced prefrontal cortex, they gained the ability 
to engage in abstract reasoning and planning—the ability to mentally simulate objects 
(including themselves) across time, and imagine the way that future events (hunts, crop 
 3 
 
harvests, social interactions) might unfold. However, due to this simulation, humans 
eventually became aware of the inevitable fact that all forms of life, including 
themselves, are impermanent. Although other animals are able to recognize immediate 
threats of mortality such as the threat of a charging lion that could easily kill them, only 
humans are consciously aware of the inevitability of death. 
Such an awareness can potentially leave humans with a profound problem: one is 
aware of impending mortality but has no way of avoiding such a threat. Thus, according 
to TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986), in the absence of physical recourse, humans have 
developed psychological ways of mitigating the problem, by developing and participating 
in permanence-promising cultural systems. Cultural worldviews, shared sets of beliefs, 
values, and customs, imbue the world with a sense of meaning, purpose, value, and 
significance, and ultimately offer a set of social standards by which humans can qualify 
for a death-denying sense of permanence. One form of this permanence is through a 
legacy, a form of symbolic, non-supernatural (secular) immortality: the notion that one 
continues to live on after death through one’s lifetime accomplishments, such as 
contributions through patriotism, business acumen, creative projects such as art, 
literature, and film, and progeny, just to name a few (Routledge, Arndt, 2008). A second 
form of permanence promised by some cultures is supernatural (religious) immortality: 
the notion that although one may physically die, one will continue to exist eternally via a 
soul (Kesebir, 2011). This kind of immortality is almost exclusively provided by 
religions, which outline concepts consistent with eternal life, such as spirits, gods, souls, 
creation, afterlife, heavens, and so on. This latter form of immortality has a long history 
and is an especially effective terror management system given that it directly addresses 
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the problem of death by suggesting that physical death is actually not the end (Becker, 
1973).  
A significant amount of research has gone into testing the claims of TMT. Much 
of this work makes use of the mortality salience hypothesis (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), which holds that: if faith in cultural worldviews 
helps manage the awareness of death, then increasing mortality salience (MS) should 
increase faith in one’s cultural worldviews. In such research studies, participants are first 
randomly assigned to either a MS condition or a control topic condition (other similarly 
negative, but not mortality-related, topics, e.g., pain, failure, loneliness, uncertainty), and 
then are given an opportunity to express faith in their cultural worldviews. MS has been 
primed numerous ways (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010), from simply asking 
participants to write about the thoughts that the awareness of their death arouses in them, 
to subliminal priming of the word “DEATH”, to field studies with various proximity to 
death-related stimuli such as cemeteries, funeral services, or even insurance logos or 
news headlines (e.g., political issues such as terrorism, capital punishment, abortion, war, 
violent crime, natural disasters, etc.). MS effects have been observed in hundreds of 
studies, on worldview-relevant topics ranging from defense of one’s country and national 
identity, attitudes toward animals, health risk evaluations, sports team affiliations, 
physical aggression, attitudes toward women, self-complexity, academic test scores, 
public policy issues, and so on (Burke et al., 2010).    
For example, one study by Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 
(1995) investigated the effects of MS on people’s performance on a creative problem-
solving task in which the solution to the tasks involved desecrating revered cultural 
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symbols (e.g., sifting sand from a jar of ink using an American flag, thus defacing the 
flag). MS caused participants to take twice as long to complete the task when they 
required the desecration of cultural symbols. Other studies have found that MS increases 
self-esteem striving in participants (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & 
Schimel, 2004), which is consistent with the idea that self-esteem reflects a positive 
evaluation of whether one is living up to the permanence-promising standards and values 
of one’s culture and can therefore be considered a valuable member and contributor to 
their culture.  
TMT and Religion 
From a TMT perspective, religion serves as a very effective way to manage death 
awareness, given that it can provide both non-supernatural and supernatural immortality. 
Regarding the former, religious believers can attain a non-supernatural legacy through 
their religion by spreading the teachings and doctrines of their faith to their children and 
other non-believers to perpetuate and increase the dominance and perceived veracity of 
their religious views. However, the primary element that distinguishes religion from other 
non-religious cultural beliefs is that religions offer supernatural permanence—concepts 
(e.g., souls, spirits, gods, heaven) that provide literal permanence after one’s physical 
death. This desire for permanence has featured in thousands of now-defunct religions and 
mythologies and continues to be a fundamental feature in various contemporary world 
religions, each supplying their own spiritual solution to the problem of human mortality 
through their own theological doctrines.  
Given the role that religion’s supernatural immortality can play in assuaging death 
anxiety, several empirical studies have investigated mortality salience and religious 
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belief. One study found that when Christian participants were reminded of mortality they 
increased their defense of their worldview by increasing support for a Christian who 
shared their worldview, but not for a Jewish person (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland, & Lyon 1990). Another study by Osarchuk and Tatz 
(1973), found that MS caused believers to increase their faith in an afterlife. Furthermore, 
numerous studies have investigated the effects of MS on belief in supernatural agents 
(spirits, gods), which supply the theological foundation for spiritual existence, an 
afterlife, and an immortal soul. One study by Norenzayan and Gervais (2006) found that 
when religious participants were made aware of death, they increased belief in various 
supernatural agents. Additionally, Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi (2012) found that MS led 
American Christians and Iranian Muslims to each increase general religiosity and faith in 
a higher power; but, more specifically, MS also led Christians to increase faith in 
God/Jesus and reject other religions’ agents (Allah, Buddha), and led Iranian Muslims to 
increase belief in Allah and reject the agents of other religions (God/Jesus, Buddha). 
Jong, Halberstadt, & Bluemke (2012) found similar findings, showing that MS led 
Christians to increase general religiosity. 
Other related research has provided evidence that affirming afterlife beliefs and 
religious concepts can serve as a buffer to the awareness of death. One study (Dechesne, 
Pyszczynski, Arndt, Ransom, Sheldon, Knippenberg, & Janssen, 2003) had participants 
read a fake article ostensibly about Harvard medical research, reporting examinations of 
over 600 out of body near death experiences, in which survivors reported floating above 
their bodies and seeing deceased loved ones, and concluded this as evidence of an 
afterlife. Other participants read a different article that offered the alternative conclusion 
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that such an experience is the by-product of biological processes, such as oxygen 
deprivation in the brain. MS produced the usual defensive responses among participants 
in the afterlife-debunked group, but not in the afterlife-affirmation group, suggesting that 
the affirmation of spiritual afterlife served as a buffer against mortality awareness and its 
consequences. Another study (Jackson, Jong, Bluemke, Poulter, Morgenroth, & 
Halberstadt, 2017) investigated the extent to which one’s religious views are capable of 
psychologically shielding oneself from the anxiety of one’s death. They found that 
believers reported higher death anxiety when their worldview was threatened, and that 
religious belief alleviated believer’s implicit death anxiety.  
Another study by Schimel, Hayes, Williams, and Jahrig (2007) showed that when 
creationist participants were exposed to a scientific article challenging the validity of 
creationism and arguing instead in favor of evolution, they reported increased death 
thought accessibility (indicating that creationism was being effectively used to shield 
against death thought) but not after reading an article on a neutral topic. Other research 
investigating the buffering effects of religious beliefs found that MS can increase 
participant’s belief in intelligent design (creationism) rather than evolutionary theory 
(Tracey, Hart, & Martens, 2011). Given that religion provides an explanation of the 
universe, existence, and individual lives as an intended phenomenon created for a 
purpose, these teleological worldviews help to buffer the existential anxiety produced by 
the insignificance of individual existence. These studies lend further support to the notion 
that belief in supernatural agency and spiritual immortality serve a unique protection 
from the awareness of mortality. Indeed, Davis, Juhl, & Routledge (2011) found that 
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experimentally elevating teleological beliefs reduced death thought accessibility, while 
mortality salience increased teleological beliefs, despite judgement errors.   
These studies provide strong empirical support for the notion that religious 
concepts serve a special terror management function given that they deny the 
impermanence that is related to death. Rather, religion offers that the continuation of the 
self is possible after death. However, despite the usefulness and effectiveness of these 
religious buffers, there are a population of individuals that are reluctant to embrace these 
beliefs, and others who even go so far as to outright reject them. Such people provide an 
interesting demographic worth considering and studying, to further understand the 
intricacies and exceptions behind the acceptance and rejection of religious beliefs and the 
mechanics of terror management more broadly.  
Atheism, TMT, and Analytic Thinking 
Recent polls (Pew, 2015) show that the number of people in the world who 
identify as non-religious is on the rise, with different categories of religious skepticism, 
including spiritual but unaffiliated, agnostics, and atheists. The spiritual but unaffiliated 
are individuals who apparently still accept supernatural concepts such as gods, souls, and 
heaven, but choose not to identify with a particular organized religion, denomination, or 
form of worship. Research has shown that up to 50% of those who report themselves as 
unaffiliated still believe in supernatural concepts (Vernon 1969, Baker & Smith, 2009), 
making them unlikely to abstain from expressing faith in supernatural concepts to 
manage the awareness of death.  
More genuinely skeptical are the agnostics and atheists. Agnostics differ from the 
spiritual but unaffiliated in that they believe that it is epistemologically impossible to 
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have knowledge as to whether supernatural concepts, such as God, exist or not. But by 
the same token, while agnosticism does not embrace a belief in God, it also does not 
reject the possibility that a God does exist; it simply claims that one cannot know for sure 
if either position is true. Atheists, however, differ from both the spiritual but unaffiliated 
and the agnostics in that they express a stronger skepticism of religion and religious 
claims, rejecting the existence of God and supernatural concepts as altogether 
unwarranted ideas (Dawkins, 2006). Many atheists tend to reject religion and its doctrines 
on the grounds that religious and spiritual claims do not meet the burden of proof (Russel, 
1957). In particular, atheists would argue that there is no valid scientific evidence for the 
existence of God, and potentially some evidence that makes the existence of one (or 
many) unlikely (e.g., Dawkins, 2006). Given that atheists reject the supernatural claims 
made by religion, one important question is whether atheists are able to maintain their 
rejection of available religious and supernatural concepts and beliefs when coping with 
the awareness of death. 
One response to that question takes the form of the popular aphorism, “There are 
no atheists in foxholes,” implying that the awareness of death is enough to inspire 
religious faith. However, the existence of groups like the Military Association of Atheists 
and Freethinkers serves as anecdotal evidence of atheists who face the threat of death 
often, as soldiers, yet still maintain their atheism and reject religious faith. Additionally, 
qualitative research on atheists on their deathbeds revealed that they typically requested 
that hospital staff refrain from bed-side proselytizing and respect their (dis)beliefs (Smith 
& Stoner, 2007). These two social examples represent anecdotal evidence that there are 
atheists in foxholes.  
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But while social examples are insightful and useful, experimental research is still 
needed for such questions. There are several studies that have tested MS effects among 
the non-religious and have found that MS does not increase their expressed faith 
(Norenzayan & Hansen, 2012; Vail et al., 2012; Jong et al 2012). A study by Vail et al. 
(2012), that specifically sampled atheists, found that MS did not lead atheists to report 
stronger religiosity, faith in a higher power, or faith in any of various supernatural agents. 
Other research (Jong et al., 2012) has assessed the impact of MS on non-religious 
participants’ implicit associations and explicit religious faith. In two studies, when 
participants were asked to categorize various stimuli words as quickly as possible, MS 
led non-religious participants to more quickly associate supernatural concepts (e.g., 
heaven, god) with “real” rather than “imaginary,” perhaps indicating an initial implicit 
activation of supernatural concepts when made aware of death. However, in a third study, 
when participants were asked to explicitly indicate their faith on Likert-type items, at 
their own pace, the non-religious participants again continued to explicitly reject religious 
faith even after MS. Together, these findings suggest that when atheists are reminded of 
death they may initially implicitly activate religious concepts, to reflexively prepare 
themselves to express terror-managing faith in supernatural concepts; but, when given 
time to reflect on supernatural concepts, over-ride that preparation and ultimately reject 
religious/supernatural beliefs given the stance that such supernatural claims do not meet 
the logical burdens of proof.  
Indeed, recent research suggests that religious concepts, such as supernatural 
agency and teleological creation, are developmentally natural intuitions, meaning that the 
religious conceptualizations of supernatural agents, immortal souls, and afterlife are 
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buttressed by basic, evolutionarily adaptive cognitive inclinations to make intuitive 
causal attributions and interpret others’ intentions (theory of mind), make moral 
judgments, engage in social learning, and judge the utility or purposes of people and 
objects (teleological reasoning), among other tasks (Barrett, 2000, 2004; Bering, 2006, 
2010; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 1994; Guthrie, 1993). As but one example, the evolutionarily 
adaptive ability to detect the intentions and desires of others created an “intuitive” 
inclination to see agency where there is none, to see “faces in the clouds” (Guthrie, 1993; 
Barrett, 2000). Implicit preferences for teleological explanations in both children and 
adults have led Kelemen and Rosset (2009) to argue that teleological explanations are 
used as a default explanation for many phenomena. Such research can help to explain 
why religion comes so naturally to humans, why it is a nearly universal phenomenon, and 
perhaps also why even atheists will implicitly activate religious concepts when aware of 
death. However, although religious and supernatural tendencies are intuitive, or natural, 
this does not mean that such intuitions will inevitably lead atheists to accept the 
supernatural concepts or explicit belief.  
Recently, Norenzayan & Gervais (2013) have provided data-based arguments 
concerning the cognitive and motivational factors by which religious beliefs and concepts 
may be accepted. First, atheism can emerge due to a cognitive inability to mentally 
comprehend the concept of gods or supernatural agents. Such is the case among people 
with autism (Norenzayan, Gervais, & Trzesniewski, 2012) and among young children 
(Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007), both having difficulty representing others’ minds. 
Second, atheism may emerge when individuals are not motivated to convert religious 
intuitions into explicit belief, such as if a region is marked by relative economic 
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prosperity, health, and safety (Zuckerman, 2008). Third, atheism may emerge in regions 
characterized by strong secular cultures rather than in cultures shaped by religion. The 
fourth factor, engaging in analytic processing, is a much more common—and is by far the 
most commonly reported reason for atheism (Silver, 2014). Research on this topic is 
consistent with dual-process models of cognitive processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Evans, 2008, 2010; also, Baumard & Boyer, 2013) which hold that intuitive processing 
(System 1) is quick, automatic, and implicit, whereas reflective processing (System 2) is 
typically slower, more deliberate, and explicit. For example, rather than relying on 
intuitive cognitive processes, which is associated with stronger religious belief, weaker 
and less prevalent religious belief occurs among those who engage in more analytic 
thinking. While analytic cognitive style helps over-ride cognitive intuitions that lead, for 
example, to endorsement of creationism rather than evolution (Gervais, 2015), 
experimental evidence shows that activating analytic thinking (e.g., via perceptual 
disfluency, or image-based or lexical primes of analytic thinking concepts), presumably 
over-riding intuition, decreases religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012).  
Furthermore, experimental conditions that prevent analytic thinking (e.g., high-
speed response trials) have been shown to prevent people from engaging in analytical 
thinking and over-riding those intuitions—leading even Finns and American atheists to 
make cognitively intuitive errors consistent with religious creationist views (Jarnefelt, 
Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015). For example, Jarnefelt et al., 2015 presented believers and 
non-believers with images of both living and non-living things (e.g., a giraffe, a 
mountain) and asked them to judge whether “any being purposefully made the thing in 
the picture”, to measure teleological reasoning. When participants answered the questions 
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at their own pace, believers gave more teleological answers (the object was made by a 
“being”) than did non-believers (the object was not made by a “being”). However, when 
speeded, non-believer’s answers were more teleological, resembling those of believers. 
This suggests that when speeding restricts non-believer’s ability to engage in reflective 
thinking (system 2), forcing them to rely on intuitive processes (system 1), their 
responses become similar to that of religious individuals, revealing implicit reliance on 
teleological intuitions. This perspective further offers a way to understand why atheists 
reminded of death initially implicitly activate religious concepts (Jong et al., 2012), but 
maintain their rejection of religion when asked to provide explicit responses on self-
report measures. This analysis leads to the novel theoretical perspective that atheists 
maintain their disbelief, even when made aware of death, by cognitively over-riding the 
motivation to express religious faith—and, therefore, that conditions that prevent people 
from cognitively over-riding religious intuitions would result in reminders of mortality 
leading even atheists to increase expressed religious faith.
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CHAPTER II 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
The present research sought out to explore the role that analytic thinking may play 
in maintaining atheism in the face of the awareness of death, and further investigate the 
question of whether there are atheists in foxholes. The present study sampled atheists and 
used a 2 (MS vs control) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded trials) x 4 (DV items: religious vs. 
intuitive but incorrect [teleological] vs. intuitive and correct [yes-bias] vs. non-intuitive 
and incorrect [no-bias]) design, explained further immediately below.  
First, atheists were recruited based on a premeasure in which respondents 
identified their religious persuasion. Second, participants were contacted and recruited to 
complete the primary materials. The materials were borrowed methods from previous 
research (Vail et al., 2012) to manipulate the awareness of mortality (MS prime vs. 
control topic prime). Then, borrowing from both Kelemen et al., (2009) and Vail et al., 
(2012), participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a series of Likert-type 
self-report items assessing 1) religious faith, 2) agreement with intuitive but factually 
incorrect statements about teleological design, 3) intuitive and factually correct 
statements about causation and teleology (designed to bias questions toward agreement; a 
“yes”-bias), and 4) non-intuitive and factually incorrect statements about causation and 
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teleology (designed to bias questions toward disagreement; a “no”-bias). This measure 
was then manipulated according to Kelemen’s method; participants were randomly 
assigned to either complete the measure at their leisure (a typical Likert-type self-report; 
“unspeeded trials” condition) or under a time pressure (“speeded trials” condition).The 
purpose of the time pressure condition was to prevent participants from having the time 
to cognitively over-ride their intuitions, whatever those intuitions may be. 
The first hypothesis was: a replication of prior research (Kelemen et al., 2009) in 
the control condition, such that low agreement with the teleological items should be 
found in the un-speeded condition, but that they should increase agreement in the speeded 
trials condition—reflecting a reduced ability to logically over-ride intuitive concepts.  
The second hypothesis was a simple extension of that prior research, connecting it 
directly to religious faith. In the control condition, it was expected that atheists in the un-
speeded condition would report low agreement with the religious faith items but increase 
expression of faith in the speeded condition—reflecting a reduced ability to analytically 
over-ride intuitively appealing, yet logically unwarranted (from an atheistic perspective), 
concepts. 
The third and focal hypothesis was a full extension, intersecting this prior work 
with the motivational factor of death awareness. It was expected that in the un-speeded 
condition, MS (vs. control) would have no impact on what is anticipated to be atheists’ 
rejection of the religious and teleological items—reflecting the idea that, even in the 
awareness of death, atheists likely utilize their analytic resources to cognitively over-ride 
such otherwise intuitive concepts. However, in the speeded condition, MS (vs. control) 
was expected to increase atheists’ agreement with the religious and teleological items—
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reflecting the idea that the awareness of death exert a motivational influence on belief in 
intuitive (yet unwarranted) concepts if atheists are unable to wield their analytic resources 
to cognitively over-ride such processes. Lastly, we expected to find no effects of MS, or 
the MS x Trial Speeding interaction, on the yes-bias or no-bias items.
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Estimation of Minimum Sample Size 
Sample size planning was based on selecting a “minimally important effect size” 
threshold (effects below which would be disregarded as trivial). The target analyses 
involved one set of religious/supernatural concepts dependent measures (with three 
subscales of general, Christian, and Hindu varieties) and one dependent measure on 
unjustified teleological statements.  
Sample size planning for the first set was based on repeated measure ANOVA 
techniques, with an effect size of measuring the effect of a possible MS*Speed 
interaction on the three subscale measures of general, Christian, and Hindu 
religious/supernatural beliefs. Using an a-priori power analysis for F-family tests for 
ANOVA (repeated measures, within-between interaction) (G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009), we selected a minimum effect size threshold of f = .175 (a 
small-medium effect), and set power to .80 for detecting effects at p = .05, with 4 groups, 
3 measures, and an assumed (but actually unknown) correlation between measures of r = 
.50. This analysis recommended a minimum sample size of at least 80 participants.  
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Sample size planning for the second dependent measure was based on ANOVA 
techniques, with an effect size of measuring the effect of a possible MS*Speed 
interaction on agreement with the teleological statements. Using an a-priori power 
analysis for F-family tests for ANOVA (fixed effects, special, main effects, and 
interactions) (G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), we selected a 
minimum effect size threshold of f = .175 (a small-medium effect), and set power to .80 
for detecting effects at p = .05, with 1 numerator df and 4 groups. This analysis 
recommended a minimum sample size of at least 259 participants.  
Recruitment 
Due to the difficulty of recruiting sufficient numbers of atheists from the local 
population, a research panel company, TurkPrime, was hired to recruit atheist participants 
throughout the USA. TurkPrime is an academic research panel recruitment firm, and is a 
third-party entity separate from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowd-sourced 
workforce platform. TurkPrime offers options for interfacing with MTurk’s web-based 
workforce platform, but it also offers a number of other targeted recruitment services. An 
initial assessment by TurkPrime determined that there were not enough naïve atheists 
available via MTurk, so recruitment was instead accomplished through TurkPrime’s 
independent PrimePanels recruitment service, which extends beyond MTurk to hundreds 
of other web-based platforms to reach up to 20 million respondents globally. The survey 
was set-up/coded on Qualtrics, and TurkPrime used PrimePanels to distribute the 
Qualtrics link to panel members who had previously indicated being “atheist” on a 
demographic item. Data collection took place over roughly two weeks (March 6-22, 
2018) at the cost of $4.00 per respondent.  
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Participant Characteristics 
A total of 497 panel members were initially recruited and completed the informed 
consent; 53 respondents either did not provide any data or discontinued the study, and 
thus did not respond to the MS manipulation, DVs, and/or complete the demographic 
survey (thus not able to confirm their atheist status). Of the remaining 444 participants, 
70 reported being something other than atheist (34 “agnostic”, 28 “spiritual”, 3 
“Christian”, 1 “Hindu”, 1 “Buddhist”, 1 “Jewish”, and 2 “other”). Of the remaining 374 
atheists who completed the study, one skipped the manipulation and one skipped the 
dependent variable and were necessarily dropped.  
Thus, the final sample consisted of 372 atheists who completed all the key 
manipulations and dependent variables. At the end of the survey, participants indicated 
age, sex, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, years of education, and political orientation 
(see descriptives in Table 1). 
Materials and Procedure 
In all cases, the study link was distributed using a neutral title and description 
(e.g., “A survey about social attitudes and personality”) to conceal its true purpose and 
associated hypotheses. Upon obtaining informed consent, the following materials were 
presented. 
Cover story, personality measure. To bolster the cover story and acclimate 
respondents to the survey format, a six-item version of the personal need for structure 
scale (PNS, Thomson et al., 2001) was presented. The PNS scale measures individual 
preferences for order, certainty, and unambiguous knowledge. Example items include, “I 
enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life” and “I become uncomfortable when the 
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rules in a situation are not clear.” Each item used a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 6 = strongly agree). This measure is unrelated to the present hypothesis, and so 
will not be further mentioned. 
Mortality salience manipulation. Following previous research (Rosenblatt et al., 
1989), participants were randomly assigned to respond to either MS or a negative event 
topic prompt. In the MS condition, two prompts asked participants to, “Please briefly 
describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you,” and “Jot down, 
as specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you physically die and once 
you are physically dead.” The negative event topic prompts asked participants parallel 
questions about public speaking. This comparison topic was chosen to determine whether 
MS causes any effects beyond simply being a negative event. 
Delay and distraction. Next, the 26-item positive and negative affect schedule 
(PANAS, Lambert, Eadeh, Peak, Scherer, Schott, & Slochower, 2014) was administered1, 
as well as a brief 3-5 minute reading task (an excerpt taken from Albert Camus’ The 
Growing Stone), followed by the self-affirmation manipulation. These materials were 
included to provide the delay and task-switching distraction needed to move death-
awareness out of focal attention to observe distal terror management effects (see 
Pyszczynski, et al., 1999). 
Time pressure manipulation. Participants were then randomly assigned to either 
a speeded or unspeeded condition. In the unspeeded condition, they were allowed to 
respond to each item at their own pace. In the speeded condition, however, they had just 
3 seconds to respond to each dependent variable item. All participants were first 
presented with a “practice block” of 8 items for the sole purpose of acclimating 
                                                 
1 Interested readers can find supplemental analyses on affect in Appendix B. 
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participants to the task. Following the practice block, the task paused, the instructions 
were presented again, and then participants completed a “target block” of 40 items that 
contained the key dependent measures. In the un-speeded condition, participants were 
told they would be able to take their time and think about their response, whereas 
participants in the speeded condition were informed that they would only have three 
seconds, and since this was a short period of time, they would need to respond as quickly 
as they could. See Appendix A for specific instructions, including language about the 
time-pressure manipulation, used in each condition. 
Target block: dependent measures and checks. A total of 40 items were 
included in the target block and were presented in random order for each participant.  
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts. The primary target dependent measure 
consisted of 12 items which assessed faith in religious/supernatural concepts (a = .92). 
Six of these items were domain-general (a = .84); three of those items explicitly evoked 
Christian religious/supernatural concepts (a = .87); and the remaining three of those items 
explicitly evoked Hindu religious/supernatural concepts (a = .81). An overall mean score 
was computed such that higher scores indicated greater faith. 
Teleological reasoning. A second target dependent measure similarly consisted of 
12 items assessing agreement with intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological 
statements (a = .79). A mean score was computed such that higher scores indicated 
greater teleological thinking. 
Manipulation checks. One set of items were included to check stimuli processing 
ability (accuracy-check) across conditions, and two sets of items were included to check 
whether the manipulation successfully impaired System 2 processing. To check stimuli 
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processing ability, one set of four accuracy-check items instructed participants to select 
“strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree,” respectively. To check 
whether the manipulation successfully impaired System 2 processing, one set of 6 items 
assessed agreement/disagreement with statements that were intuitive and logically correct 
( = .75), and another set of 6 items assessed agreement/disagreement with statements 
that were counter-intuitive and logically incorrect ( = .84). Item mean scores were used. 
Whereas participants in the unspeeded condition should get the benefit of System 1 
intuition as well as System 2 style reflective thought, and thus have stronger 
agreement/disagreement responses, those in the speeded condition were expected to have 
similarly biased—but weaker—responses due to the impairment of additional System 2 
processing. 
Participants were presented with items religious and teleological items and asked 
to indicate their agreement with those items using a 4-point Likert-type response scale (1 
= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree)2, as listed in Table 2. 
Once they had selected their agreement with the item, the participants continued to the 
next item by pressing a NEXT button presented at the bottom of the screen. In the 
speeded condition, if the time ran out before the participants could press next, their 
answer was saved, and they were quickly presented with the next item. Timings were also 
recorded for all target block items, including time-to-first-click and time-to-item-
submission. All dependent measure items are included in Appendix A.  
                                                 
2 The Qualtrics multiple-choice item option required that participants click one of four small radio buttons, 
which pilot testing revealed to be exceptionally difficult to click/tap quickly in the speeded condition. 
Therefore, an image of a 1x4 bordered table showing the four Likert-type response options was created (see 
Appendix A); each item was coded in Qualtrics as a “hotspot” item, with the item statement presented 
above the image, and with four separate/independent hotspot response fields superimposed over the table 
cells so that clicking/tapping a particular table cell would toggle that particular response field’s data entry 
to “on” or “off”. After completion of the study, these verbal on/off data were cleaned by converting each 
item with a single valid hotspot response into a single 1-4 numeric rating. 
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Demographics, religious/philosophical identification. At the end of the survey, 
participants completed a demographic questionnaire. The demographics page asked about 
age, sex, race, ethnicity, education level, political orientation, and religious/philosophical 
identification. Regarding religious identification, response options were: “Christian”; 
“Muslim”; “Jewish”; “Buddhist”; “Hindu”; “Spiritual”; “Agnostic”; “Atheist” and 
“other.” Data from atheist respondents were retained for analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Response Speed. To measure and compare the speed-of-processing for each of 
the four target measures, time-to-first-click and time-to-item-submission were recorded 
and are analyzed below in seconds.  
Time to first click. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) x 3 (repeated 
measures: general religious/supernatural vs Christian supernatural vs Hindu supernatural 
vs teleological) mixed-model ANOVA found no main effect of measure (F(3, 1104) = 
.86, p2 = .002, p = .46), and no MS*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) = .51, p2 = .001, p 
= .67) nor Speed*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) = .79, p2 = .002, p = .50) nor three-
way interaction (F(3, 1104) = .53, p2 = .001, p = .66), suggesting that any possible 
effects of the manipulations on time-to-first-click did not differ across the measures of 
faith in general, Christian, and Hindu supernatural concepts, and teleological statements. 
Also, there was no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 1.66, p2 = .004, p = .20) nor an 
MS*Speed interaction, F(1, 368) = 1.78, p2 = .005, p = .18. However, there did emerge 
the expected main effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 11.18, p2 = .03, p = .001), such 
that time-to-first-click was faster in the speeded condition (M = 1.45, SD = .27) compared 
to the un-speeded condition (M = 4.31, SD = 11.66).  
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Time to item submission. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) x 3 
(repeated measures: general religious/supernatural vs Christian supernatural vs Hindu 
supernatural vs teleological) mixed-model ANOVA found no main effect of measure 
(F(3, 1104) = 1.07, p2 = .003, p = .36), and no MS*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) = 
.66, p2 = .002, p = .58) nor Speed*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) = .84, p2 = .002, p = 
.47) nor three-way interaction (F(3, 1104) = .65, p2 = .002, p = .58), suggesting that any 
possible effects of the manipulations on time-to-item-submission did not differ across the 
measures of faith in general, Christian, and Hindu supernatural concepts, and teleological 
statements. Also, there was no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 1.43, p2 = .004, p = .23) 
nor an MS*Speed interaction, F(1, 368) = 1.53, p2 = .004, p = .22. However, there did 
emerge the expected main effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 11.15, p2 = .03, p = 
.001), such that time-to-first-click was faster in the speeded condition (M = 2.61, SD = 
.39) compared to the un-speeded condition (M = 5.52, SD = 11.87).  
Stimuli processing ability. Given that some participants were responding 
quickly, we also checked whether participants were indeed able to read the items under 
each speed condition, by inspecting the overall accuracy rates across the four accuracy-
check items embedded at random in the target block. Item 1 instructed a “strongly 
disagree” response; item 2 “disagree”; item 3 “agree”; and item 4 “strongly agree.” These 
items were not used as exclusion criteria, nor as covariates, because it was anticipated 
that the speeded condition would be demanding and therefore suppress response rates but 
also that response rates would be orthogonal to comprehension. Indeed, in the unspeeded 
condition, participants (n = 191) faced 764 accuracy-check items and only had 4 missed 
responses for a non-response rate of .005%; whereas in the speeded condition, 
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participants (n = 181) faced a total of 724 accuracy-check items and had 133 missed 
responses for a non-response rate of 18.37%. However, the accuracy rates were high in 
both conditions. In the unspeeded condition, of the 760 responses given, a total of 748 
(98.42%) were able to accurately follow the item instructions; whereas in the speeded 
condition, of the 591 responses given, a total of 548 (92.72%) were able to comprehend 
the items and accurately follow the item instructions. These findings indicate that 
participants in both conditions were indeed able to read and comprehend the check items 
with high accuracy. 
 System 2 processing manipulation check. Next, we checked whether the speed 
manipulation had the desired effect of manipulating participants’ ability to use System 2 
processing to reflectively regulate their responses on items with a clearly 
correct/incorrect answer. First, we analyzed agreement/disagreement with 6 items that 
were intuitive and logically correct ( = .75); System 1 should produce an intuitive 
agreement bias, and System 2 should solidify that agreement further via reflective 
thought. Second, we analyzed agreement/disagreement with 6 items that were counter-
intuitive and logically incorrect ( = .84); System 1 should produce an intuitive 
disagreement bias, and System 2 should solidify that disagreement further via reflective 
thought. Thus, if the time pressure in the speeded condition impairs System 2 processing, 
then agreement/disagreement should be less extreme than in the unspeeded condition 
where participants would get the benefit of System 1 intuition as well as System 2 style 
reflective thought. 
Intuitive and logically justified/correct items. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs 
speeded) ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 2.05, p2 = .006, p = .15), 
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nor a two-way interaction, F(1, 368) = .34, p2 = .001, p = .56. However, there did 
emerge a significant main effect of speed condition, F(1, 368) = 8.92, p2 = .02, p = .003, 
such that agreement with these statements was higher in the unspeeded condition (M = 
3.56, SD = .37) compared to the speeded condition (M = 3.43, SD = .52), indicating that 
the ability to use System 2 reflective thought was impaired in the speeded condition. 
Counter-intuitive and logically unjustified/incorrect items. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 
(unspeeded vs speeded) ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 366) = .81, p2 = 
.002, p = .37) nor two-way interaction, F(1, 366) = .005, p2 < .001, p = .94. However, 
there did emerge a significant main effect of speed condition, F(1, 366) = 39.74, p2 = 
.10, p < .001 such that rejection of the logical-no statements was stronger in the 
unspeeded condition (M = 1.14, SD = .31) compared to the speeded condition (M = 1.44, 
SD = .59), indicating that the ability to use System 2 reflective thought was impaired in 
the speeded condition.  
Summary. Together, these preliminary findings indicate that participants in the 
speeded (vs unspeeded) condition were effectively pressured to respond quickly, and that 
although they were still able to read and comprehend the items accurately under time 
pressure, the time pressure successfully impaired their System 2 style reflective ability. 
Target Analyses 
 Descriptive statistics for the target analyses, by condition, are listed in Table 3.  
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs 
speeded) x 3 (repeated measures of faith in supernatural concepts: general vs Christian vs 
Hindu) mixed-model ANOVA revealed a main effect of measure (F(2, 736) = 46.24, p2 
= .11, p < .001), such that atheists rejected Christian supernatural concepts (M = 1.22, SD 
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= .44) more strongly than Hindu supernatural concepts (M = 1.27, SD = .45) which were 
also rejected more strongly than general supernatural concepts (M = 1.41, SD = .51) (all 
t(370)s > 2.94, p < .003). However, there was no MS*measure interaction (F(2, 736) = 
.96, p2 = .003, p = .37) nor Speed*measure interaction (F(2, 736) = 1.73, p2 = .005, p = 
.18) nor three-way interaction (F(2, 736) = 2.17, p2 = .006, p = .12), suggesting that any 
possible effects of the manipulations did not differ across the measures of faith in 
general, Christian, and Hindu supernatural concepts3.  
Also, there was no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = .67, p2 = .002, p = .41) nor a 
main effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = .80, p2 = .002, p = .80). However, there did 
emerge the predicted MS*Speed interaction, F(1, 368) = 5.91, p2 = .01, p = .02 (see 
Figure 1). In the unspeeded condition, rejection of faith in supernatural/religious 
concepts was significantly stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking 
condition (t[189] = -2.34, d = -.35, 95%CI [-.64, -.06], p = .02). However, in the speeded 
condition, rejection of faith in supernatural/religious concepts was non-significantly 
reduced in the MS condition compared to the public speaking condition (t[179] = 1.13, d 
= .17, 95%CI [-.12, .46], p = .26). 
Intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological statements. A 2 (MS 
vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) 
= 1.74, p2 = .005, p = .19), although there did emerge a significant main effect of speed 
condition, F(1, 368) = 11.60, p2 = .03, p = .001, such that agreement with the intuitive 
but unjustified/incorrect teleological statements was higher in the speeded condition (M = 
3.14, SD = .47) compared to the unspeeded condition (M = 2.96, SD = .49). There was no 
                                                 
3 Interested readers can find supplemental analyses and figures for the three separate subscales in Appendix 
B. 
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significant 2-way interaction, F(1, 368) = .28, p2 = .001, p = .60 (Figure 2). In the 
unspeeded condition, agreement with the unjustified teleological statements was non-
significantly stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] = 
1.33, d = .18, 95%CI [-.10, .47], p = .19). However, in the speeded condition, there was 
no difference in agreement with the unjustified teleological statements in the MS 
condition compared to the public speaking condition (t[179] = .56, d = .11, 95%CI [-.19, 
.40], p = .58).  
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CHAPTER V  
DISCUSSION 
First, I hypothesized that atheists in the un-speeded conditions would report low 
agreement with the teleological items, but that they would increase agreement in the 
speeded trials condition. This hypothesis was supported by the data; results revealed a 
significant main effect of the speed condition, indicating that agreement with the intuitive 
but unjustified/incorrect teleological statements was higher in the speeded condition 
compared to the un-speeded condition. Second, I hypothesized that atheists in the un-
speeded conditions should similarly report low agreement with religious items, but that 
they should increase agreement in the speeded trials condition. This hypothesis was 
unsupported by the data; there was no Speed main effect nor Speed*measure interaction, 
indicating that religious faith was not generally impacted by the speed manipulation. 
Third, we hypothesized that in the un-speeded condition, MS (vs. control) would have no 
impact on atheists’ rejection of the religious and teleological items, whereas in the 
speeded condition MS (vs. control) would increase atheists’ agreement with the religious 
and teleological items. This hypothesis received mixed support. MS led to increased 
rejection of faith in supernatural/religious concepts in the unspeeded condition, but not 
the speeded condition. Additionally, whereas there was a main effect of speed on 
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teleological reasoning, there was no main effect or interaction involving MS. 
Implications are as follows. 
Data In Context: Interpretations, Implications, and Future Directions 
First, the present work converges with prior research on the dual process model of 
cognition, suggesting that system 1 thinking is based on automatic/intuitive processing 
while system 2 thinking is more analytical (Evans, 2003; Evans, 2008; Morewedge & 
Kahneman, 2010). Previous work has found that intuitive processing can lead to the 
perception of teleological relationships between intuitively related objects, even when 
such inferences are illogical. For example, Finns and atheists in speeded conditions 
(restricting to System 1 processing) report higher teleological thinking compared to un-
speeded conditions (allowing System 2 processing; Kelemen and Rosset, 2009; Jarnefelt, 
Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015). The present research replicated those findings; atheists 
increased their agreement with logically unjustified but intuitive teleological statements 
when in a speeded condition compared to an un-speeded condition.  
Second, the present results were inconsistent with the idea that this teleological 
intuition is processed similarly to religious faith. That was an idea suggested by research 
on the cognitive science of religion (Barrett, 2000, 2004; Bering, 2006, 2010; Bloom, 
2007; Boyer, 1994; Guthrie, 1993), in addition to research suggesting that atheism and 
analytical thinking are related (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012).  However, the results 
suggest that there was no increased agreement with religious items among atheists in the 
speeded condition compared to atheists in the un-speeded condition. This finding also 
perhaps diverges from previous work by Jarnefelt (2015) which suggested that atheists 
were more likely to increase their agreement with “creationist” items and explanations 
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when in a speeded compared to an unspeeded condition. This indicates that despite the 
fact that atheists may be more likely to endorse certain forms of teleological thinking 
when speeded and relying on system 1 processes (Kelemen and Rosset, 2009), they 
generally remained reluctant to endorse religious concepts when relying on their 
intuition. This raises potential questions for future research about the nature of atheists’ 
vigilance about general teleological errors compared to specifically religious concepts. 
One possibility is that both teleological and religious concepts may indeed seem intuitive 
to atheists, but atheists may not be particularly “on guard” for mundane teleological 
statements (e.g., about the sun existing to sustain flowers) because they may not have 
previously decided to reject those ideas; in contrast, atheists may be more strongly 
vigilant about religious concepts because such concepts sit at odds with their expressed 
beliefs about the world. Another possibility is that atheists’ particular belief systems or 
explicit logical deductions may have influenced their cognitive associations such that 
supernatural concepts no longer seem intuitive to them, in which case even a speeded 
condition would not have the effect of increasing religious faith per se.  
Third, the present research also partially converges with prior research examining 
the effects of MS on atheists’ possible religious beliefs. Previous research concerning 
these issues has provided different insights into atheist’s religious beliefs when 
confronted with existential threat. In terms of explicit religiosity, Vail (2012) found that 
atheists made aware of their mortality maintain their explicit atheism, whereas Jong 
(2012) found that atheists increase their explicit atheism. Our data is more consistent 
with Jong’s findings; in the unspeeded condition, MS led atheists to demonstrate an 
increased rejection of religious concepts. These findings add support to the worldview 
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defense hypothesis (Ardnt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997), 
suggesting that when made aware of their mortality, atheists will more strongly affirm 
their support for their non-religious worldview. Additionally, prior research (Jong et al., 
2012) has also measured the effect of MS on religiosity when restricted to System 1 
processing, by using an implicit association test (IAT) of activation of religious 
concepts—finding that MS led atheists to more strongly associate religious concepts as 
“real” (vs imaginary). However, in the speeded condition, which also presumably 
restricted to System 1 processing, MS did not lead to stronger expressions of religious 
faith. There was a pattern in the predicted direction, such that in the speeded condition 
MS tended to increase religiosity, but that directional trend was not strong enough to 
reach statistical significance in this well-powered study. It is not immediately clear 
whether methodological differences can possibly account for the difference between 
these and the prior results. However, it is worth noting that the Jong studies recruited 
participants who scored low on a religiosity scale (and were thus thought to be “non-
religious”), whereas the present research recruited participants who were confirmed 
atheists; perhaps those samples represent meaningfully different populations.  
Fourth, the present work diverges from prior research finding that MS increased 
teleological beliefs (Davis, Juhl, & Routledge, 2010), suggesting that teleological beliefs 
(the notion that events, actions, or the world have intentional causes with a purpose) help 
assuage the potential anxiety that can arise from the awareness of mortality. As above, 
the present work found a directional trend such that MS tended to increase agreement 
with teleological statements, but that trend was not strong enough to reach statistical 
significance. The current and prior work used similar methods; but again, it is worth 
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noting differences in the recruited samples; the prior work recruited a general sample, 
whereas the present work recruited confirmed atheists. It is not immediately apparent 
whether or why that difference should moderate the effect, but future research could 
investigate whether it does and—if so—further investigate possible mechanisms.  
Limitations 
One of the possible limitations of the present research is the inability to monitor 
the participants in a controlled lab setting given the online nature of the study. The online 
setting, which was necessary to attain a sufficient number of atheist participants, leaves 
the researcher incapable of physically ensuring that accurate attention is being paid to the 
studies procedures throughout the duration of the experiment, although the present 
research methods did have certain attention check items in place that were designed to 
offset this potential problem and did indeed appear to verify sufficient attention 
throughout.  
Another potential limitation of this study is that there may be methodological 
complications surrounding atheist’s ability to recognize the religious content of religious 
items and tendency to associate them as false. In this case, speeding participants may be 
too crude of a way to measure atheists intuitive system 1 responses. While three seconds 
has been fast enough to lower atheist’s inhibitions about teleological items (Jarnefelt, 
2015), as mentioned previously, atheists may be more on guard for religious items and 
therefore may be quick enough to subvert any possible intuitive appeal. Previous research 
(Jong, et al 2012) has utilized implicit associations (IAT) to measure atheist’s implicit 
responses toward religious concepts. Furthermore, rather than inhibiting participants 
ability to engage system 2 cognition by speeding them, an alternative method to deplete 
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system 2 cognition and measure system 1 cognition could be to implement a cognitive 
load (have participants keep an eight-digit number in their working memory therefore 
depleting their cognitive resources). This alternative was not available for the present 
study given its online nature, where participants could not be directly monitored to ensure 
they did not cheat during this method (writing the number down as opposed to holding it 
in their working memory). These alternative methods may play a useful role in future 
research.  
Additionally, in terms of demographics, it worth mentioning that our sample of 
participants were also older than most participants in most of the previous literature. Due 
to the fact that our study was completed online and sampled atheists from across the 
country, the median age of our sample (38.38) is older than previous samples of 
participants due to their recruitment of undergraduate psychology students. Future 
research may take into consideration the role that age may play in existential threat and 
religious beliefs.  
Another area that future research could address is the role that one’s religious 
history may play in these circumstances. Although we did not assess the religious history 
of participants, atheists who were raised religious may be more likely to intuitively 
activate religious concepts given their past socialization or due to a reversion back to 
their prior defenses, than atheists who were raised in a more secular 
environment/household and have never been strongly exposed to religious doctrines. This 
kind of exploration in future research may bring to light individual factors in atheist’s 
lives concerning this complex question. 
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Conclusion 
The atheist in the proverbial foxhole has served as a topic of discussion in 
conversations concerning religious convictions, decision making, and existential threat. 
In the case of Albert Camus novel, the atheist Meursault maintains his atheism even 
though his demise is near. The present research suggests, consistent with Meursault’s 
decision and previous anecdotal evidence, that even when made aware of mortality 
atheists will stand steadfast in their convictions, maintaining their atheism despite their 
existential dilemma. While some have argued that atheists will ultimately succumb to the 
appeal of the afterlife and or a sympathetic God, others have argued that atheists will 
stand steadfast in their disbelief. While the anecdotal evidence of atheists on their 
deathbed and in combat have made it clear that atheists are capable of standing by their 
convictions in the face of death, empirical evidence has generally provided a more mixed 
answer, suggesting that atheists managing death awareness may maintain or even 
increase their disbelief when able to draw upon their beliefs (Jong et al 2012, Vail et al, 
2012), but perhaps not when pressed to rely on their intuitions (Kelemen & Rosset 2009, 
Jarnefelt, 2015). However, the present work raises questions about whether even that 
picture may be more complicated and tentative than it might seem.  
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Appendix A 
[Personality/filler items] 
 
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with 
each according to your experience. It is important for you to know that there are no 
"right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we are 
interested in your experience. 
 
1             2             3             4             5             6 
Strongly Disagree                                                                    Strongly Agree 
 
 
1. It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
2. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
3. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
4. I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 
5. I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
6. I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear. 
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Appendix B 
[MANIPULATION #1: MORTALITY SALIENCE CONDITION] 
 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
 
1.  PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF 
YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.  JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK HAPPENS 
TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE PHYSICALLY DEAD. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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[MANIPULATION #1: PUBLIC SPEAKING CONDITION] 
 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
  
 
1.  PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF 
PUBLIC SPEAKING AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.  JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
PHYSICALLY WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCE 
PUBLIC SPEAKING. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C 
PANAS [REVISED; LAMBERT ET AL., 2014] 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW. 
 
1             2             3             4             5             6 
Strongly Disagree                                                                    Strongly Agree 
 
 
1. ____ afraid   10. ____ distressed  19. ____ serene   
 
2. ____ comforted  11. ____ insecure  20. ____ sad 
 
3. ____ nervous  12. ____ soothed  21. ____ worried 
 
4. ____ happy   13. ____ irate   22. ____ dejected 
 
5. ____ anxious  14. ____ scared  23. ____ calm 
 
6. ____ at-ease  15. ____ satisfied  24. ____ relaxed 
 
7. ____ unsure   16. ____ fearful  25. ____ frightened 
 
8. ____ irritable  17. ____ mad   26. ____ uncertain 
 
9. ____ tranquil  18. ____ angry   
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Appendix D 
[MANIPULATION #2: SPEEDED CONDITION] 
 
[Instructions for the PRACTICE BLOCK:] 
In the next task, you will be presented with a series of 8 statements, presented one at a 
time, and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example: 
 
Chocolate is a delicious treat. 
 
 
In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to 
record your response and proceed to the next item.  
  
However, each item will be presented for only 3 seconds. This is a VERY short 
period of time, and means you will need to read the item and respond as quickly as 
you possibly can. 
  
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin. 
 
[The following practice block items were presented in random order, using qualtrics 
survey flow randomizing feature.] 
1. Ferns grow in forests in order to provide ground shade 
2. Trees produce oxygen so that animals can breathe 
3. The sun radiates heat in order to nurture life 
4. Rocks are sometimes jagged so that animals don’t sit on them  
5. Water freezes when the temperature drops 
6. Stoplights change color in order to control traffic 
7. Polar bears are white because the sun bleaches them 
8. Animals grow ears in order to smell things 
 
[Instructions for the TARGET BLOCK:] 
Now that you have had some practice, we will do a main target task of 40 items.  
 
As a reminder, you will be presented with a series of statements, presented one at a time, 
and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example: 
 
Chocolate is a delicious treat. 
 
 
In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to 
record your response and proceed to the next item.  
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However, each item will be presented for only 3 seconds. This is a VERY short 
period of time, and means you will need to read the item and respond as quickly as 
you possibly can. 
  
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin. 
 
[The following 40 target block items were presented in random order, using qualtrics 
survey flow randomizing feature.] 
 
Item type       Item  
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts 
 General religious/ 
supernatural concepts 
1. Religious beliefs are basically correct 
2. There is a higher power in the world 
3. People have immortal souls 
4. Supernatural beings exist (e.g., God, angels) 
5. An afterlife exists (e.g., Heaven)  
6. When I die my soul will live on 
 Christian supernatural 
concepts  
7. The Christian God is real. 
8. The Christian God answers prayers. 
9. The Christian God sometimes intervenes in the world 
 Hindu supernatural 
concepts 
10. The Hindu gods are real 
11. The Hindu gods answer prayers 
12. The Hindu gods sometimes intervene in the world 
Intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological items 
  13. Finches diversified in order to survive 
14. Germs mutate to become drug resistant 
15. Parasites multiply to infect the host 
16. Earthworms tunnel underground to aerate the soil 
17. Mites live on skin in order to consume skin cells 
18. Moss forms around rocks to help stop soil erosion 
19. Earthquakes happen because tectonic plates must realign 
20. Geysers blow in order to discharge underground heat 
21. The earth has an ozone layer to protect it from UV light 
22. The sun makes light so that plants can photosynthesize 
23. Water condenses to moisten the air 
24. Molecules fuse in order to create matter 
Intuitive and logically justified/correct items 
   25. Flowers wilt because they get dehydrated 
26. Bread rises because it contains yeast 
27. People get the flu because they catch a virus 
28. Children wear gloves to keep their hands warm 
29. Teapots whistle to signal the water is boiling 
30. People buy vacuums because they suck up dirt 
Counter-intuitive and logically unjustified/incorrect items 
  31. Zebras have black stripes because they eat coal 
32. Gusts of wind occur because animals exhale together 
33. Clouds form because bits of cotton collect together 
34. Cars have horns to illuminate dark roads 
35. Eyelashes exist so that people can wear mascara 
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36. Mothers kiss babies in order to scare them 
Accuracy checks 
  37. On this item please hit strongly disagree and hit next 
38. On this item please hit disagree and hit next 
39. On this item please hit agree and hit next 
40. On this item please hit strongly agree and hit next 
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Appendix E 
[MANIPULATION #2: UNSPEEDED CONDITION] 
 
[Instructions for the PRACTICE BLOCK:] 
In the next task, you will be presented with a series of 8 statements, presented one at a 
time, and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example: 
 
Chocolate is a delicious treat. 
 
 
In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to 
record your response and proceed to the next item.  
  
Each item will remain on the screen until you respond. This allows you to take your time, 
and means you may take your time to think about your responses. 
  
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin. 
 
[The practice block items described above were presented in random order, using 
qualtrics survey flow randomizing feature.] 
 
[Instructions for the TARGET BLOCK:] 
 
Now that you have had some practice, we will do a main target task of 40 items.  
 
As a reminder, you will be presented with a series of statements, presented one at a time, 
and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example: 
 
Chocolate is a delicious treat. 
 
 
In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to 
record your response and proceed to the next item.  
  
Each item will remain on the screen until you respond. This allows you to take your time, 
and means you may take your time to think about your responses. 
  
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin. 
 
[The 40 target block items described above were presented in random order, using 
qualtrics survey flow randomizing feature.]  
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Appendix F 
Demographic 
1.) What is your age? _____  2.) What is your sex? _____Male _____Female 
 
3.) Is English your native language?  
 
4.) What is your ethnicity? _____Hispanic or Latino _____Not Hispanic or Latino 
 
5.) What is your race? (check only one) 
_____1. Caucasian    _____4. Asian/Pacific Islander 
_____2. African American   _____5. Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
_____3. American Indian/Native Alaskan _____6. Other (specify): ____________ 
 
6.) How many years of education have you completed? __________ 
(e.g., if completed through sophomore year of high school, enter 10; if graduated from 
high school, enter 12; if four years of college, enter 16; and so on) 
 
7.) Please rate your political orientation: 
        1           2           3           4           5           6       
   Progressive                    Moderate           Conservative 
 
8.) How strongly do you identify with your political orientation, indicated in #5 above? 
        1           2           3           4           5           6 
Very Important                       Moderate                    Not at all important 
 
9.) With which political party do you most strongly identify? (circle one) 
Democratic party  Green party    Constitution party 
Republican party  Libertarian party   Other: ________ 
 
10.) How strongly do you identify with the political party indicated in #7 above? (circle 
one) 
        1           2           3           4           5           6 
Very Important                       Moderate                   Not at all important 
 
11.) Please indicate your religious affiliation, if any (please circle one): 
1. Christian 6.    Atheist (I do not believe supernatural beings exist) 
2. Muslim 7.    Spiritual (I believe supernatural beings exist, but I do not  
3. Jewish   follow a specific religion)  
4. Buddhist 8.    Agnostic (I’m not sure whether, or it is not possible to know  
5.   Hindu    whether, supernatural beings do or do not exist) 
9. Other: __________________________ 
 
12.) Please indicate the strength of your religious/philosophical belief: 
        1           2           3           4           5 
Very strong   strong    moderate   weak   very weak 
 
What do you think this study is about? ________________________________________  
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What thoughts/feelings do you have about this study? ____________________________ 
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Appendix G: Supplemental analyses 
 
Supplemental analyses of target measure components 
General supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) 
ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = .76, p2 = .002, p = .38) nor a main 
effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = .006, p2 < .001, p = .94). However, there did 
emerge the 2-way interaction, F(1, 368) = 7.33, p2 = .02, p = .007 (see Figure S1). In the 
unspeeded condition, rejection of general supernatural concepts was significantly 
stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] = -2.57, d = -.38, 
95%CI [-.67, -.09], p = .01). However, in the speeded condition, rejection of general 
supernatural concepts was non-significantly reduced in the MS condition compared to the 
public speaking condition (t[179] = 1.27, d = .15, 95%CI [-.12, .46], p = .20).  
Christian supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) 
ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 1.49, p2 = .004, p = .22) nor a main 
effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 1.12, p2 = .003, p = .29), nor the 2-way 
interaction, F(1, 368) = 1.64, p2 = .004, p = .20 (see Figure S2). In the unspeeded 
condition, rejection of Christian supernatural concepts was non-significantly stronger in 
the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] = -1.80, d = -.27, 95%CI [-
.55, .02], p = .07). However, in the speeded condition, there was no difference in 
rejection of Christian supernatural concepts in the MS condition compared to the public 
speaking condition (t[179] = .05, d = .00, 95%CI [-.29, .29], p = .97).  
Hindu supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) 
ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = .002, p2 < .001, p = .97) nor a main 
effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 2.22, p2 = .006, p = .14). However, there did 
emerge the 2-way interaction, F(1, 368) = 5.35, p2 = .01, p = .02 (see Figure S3). In the 
unspeeded condition, rejection of Hindu supernatural concepts was non-significantly 
stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] = -1.69, d = -.39, 
95%CI [-.68, -.10], p = .09). However, in the speeded condition, rejection of Hindu 
supernatural concepts was non-significantly reduced in the MS condition compared to the 
public speaking condition (t[179] = 1.58, d = .09, 95%CI [-.20, .38], p = .115).  
 
Supplemental analyses of affect 
The PANAS-L features Lambert et al.’s (2014) recommended measures of fear ( 
= .92) and anxiety ( = .86). Because the measure was presented after the MS 
manipulation and prior to the speed manipulation, a 2 (MS vs pain) group MANOVA 
was conducted, which revealed no effect on anxiety (F(1, 370) = 1.99, p2 = .005, p = 
.16) but did reveal an effect on fear (F(1, 370) = 5.69, p2 = .02, p = .02), such that fear 
was actually lower in the MS condition (M = 4.59, SD = 1.28) than in the public speaking 
condition (M = 4.89, SD = 1.19). These findings are inconsistent with Lambert and 
colleagues’ (2014) suggestion that MS causes increased anxiety and fear affect, but is 
instead consistent with the vast majority of previous TMT research showing that MS does 
not influence explicit anxiety.  
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Appendix H: Tables 
Table I: Target block and dependent measure items 
Table I. Target block and dependent measure items  
Item type Item  
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts 
 General religious/ 
supernatural concepts 
41. Religious beliefs are basically correct 
42. There is a higher power in the world 
43. People have immortal souls 
44. Supernatural beings exist (e.g., God, angels) 
45. An afterlife exists (e.g., Heaven)  
46. When I die my soul will live on 
 Christian supernatural 
concepts  
47. The Christian God is real. 
48. The Christian God answers prayers. 
49. The Christian God sometimes intervenes in the world 
 Hindu supernatural 
concepts 
50. The Hindu gods are real 
51. The Hindu gods answer prayers 
52. The Hindu gods sometimes intervene in the world 
Intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological items 
  53. Finches diversified in order to survive 
54. Germs mutate to become drug resistant 
55. Parasites multiply to infect the host 
56. Earthworms tunnel underground to aerate the soil 
57. Mites live on skin in order to consume skin cells 
58. Moss forms around rocks to help stop soil erosion 
59. Earthquakes happen because tectonic plates must realign 
60. Geysers blow in order to discharge underground heat 
61. The earth has an ozone layer to protect it from UV light 
62. The sun makes light so that plants can photosynthesize 
63. Water condenses to moisten the air 
64. Molecules fuse in order to create matter 
Intuitive and logically justified/correct items 
   65. Flowers wilt because they get dehydrated 
66. Bread rises because it contains yeast 
67. People get the flu because they catch a virus 
68. Children wear gloves to keep their hands warm 
69. Teapots whistle to signal the water is boiling 
70. People buy vacuums because they suck up dirt 
Counter-intuitive and logically unjustified/incorrect items 
  71. Zebras have black stripes because they eat coal 
72. Gusts of wind occur because animals exhale together 
73. Clouds form because bits of cotton collect together 
74. Cars have horns to illuminate dark roads 
75. Eyelashes exist so that people can wear mascara 
76. Mothers kiss babies in order to scare them 
Accuracy checks 
  77. On this item please hit strongly disagree and hit next 
78. On this item please hit disagree and hit next 
79. On this item please hit agree and hit next 
80. On this item please hit strongly agree and hit next 
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Table II: Item endorsement descriptive statistics 
Table II. Item endorsement descriptive statistics, by condition. 
 Unspeeded  Speeded 
M SD n M SD n 
1. Faith in supernatural/religious concepts         
 Mortality salience 1.21 .35 92  1.35 .44 98 
 Public speaking salience 1.35 .44 99  1.28 .38 83 
2. Intuitive but unjustified teleology        
 Mortality salience 3.01 .46 92  3.16 .54 98 
 Public speaking salience 2.92 .52 99  3.11 .38 83 
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Table III. Item endorsement descriptive statistics, by condition. 
 Unspeeded  Speeded 
M SD n M SD n 
1. General supernatural concepts        
 Mortality salience 1.31 .46 92  1.45 .57 98 
 Public speaking salience 1.50 .53 99  1.36 .46 83 
2. Christian supernatural concepts        
 Mortality salience 1.13 .36 92  1.24 .44 98 
 Public speaking salience 1.25 .51 99  1.24 .43 83 
3. Hindu supernatural concepts        
 Mortality salience 1.18 .39 92  1.36 .52 98 
 Public speaking salience 1.29 .46 99  1.25 .40 83 
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Appendix I: Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of faith in supernatural/religious 
concepts was stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. In the 
speeded condition, atheists’ rejection of faith in supernatural/religious concepts was not 
statistically different in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. 
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
strongly agree). 
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Figure 2. Atheists’ agreement with unjustified teleological statements was stronger in the 
speeded (vs unspeeded) condition, regardless of MS manipulation condition.  
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
strongly agree). 
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Figure 3. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of general religious/supernatural 
concepts was stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. In the 
speeded condition, atheists’ rejection of general religious/supernatural concepts was not 
statistically different in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. 
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
strongly agree). 
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Figure 4. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of Christian supernatural 
concepts was (non-significantly) stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking 
condition. In the speeded condition, atheists’ rejection of Christian supernatural concepts 
was not statistically different in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. 
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
strongly agree). 
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Figure 5. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of Hindu supernatural concepts 
was stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. In the speeded 
condition, atheists’ rejection of religiosity was not statistically different in the MS 
condition than the public speaking condition. 
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
strongly agree). 
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